And the table for C is such that the ordinary rule of detachment may be safely applied; that is, in this sense of 'implication ' as in others, what is implied by a true proposition is true (for the only case in which, when p = 1, Cpq also = 1, is that in which q = 1). As an illustration of a deduction from these axioms we might offer the following :-1. CpCqp 2. CCpqCCqrCpr 3. CCCpNppp 1 q/CpNp --5. 5. CpCCpNpp 2 q/CCpNpp, r/p = C5 -C3 -6 6. Cpp. (The line ' 1 q/CpNp -5' tells us that the substitution of CpNp for q in axiom 1 will yield the new law 5; while the other derivational line tells us that the substitution of CCpNpp for q and of p for r in axiom 2 will yield a long double implication in which the first antecedent is the law 5, the second antecedent the axiom 3, and the consequent the new law 6, C3 -6 being detachable as a law because the antecedent 5 is a law, and 6 because 3 is a law. 6 is of course the law of identity, 'If p then p ', which is a law in this system as in others5).
Returning to the truth-tables, it will be found that if we draw a diamond around the values for cases in which one or both of the arguments has the value --for example round the group 1 but CCLIAN-l = C-1-1 ). Similarly, Apq is not equivalent to CNpq but is a little stronger, implying but not being implied by it. To define Apq in terms of C, therefore, something a little stronger than CNpq is required. Or rather, we require something which is a little stronger than CNpq in three-valued logic, but which in two-valued logic is equivalent to it; for where the third truth-value is not involved, the tables for Apq and CNpq do coincide. This is a subtle problem, and its solution is ingenious.
One procedure which in general increases the logical force of an implicative statement is the weakening of its antecedent. Thus, 'Either Bartholomew or Philip will come ' being a weaker assertion than 'Philip will come ', 'If either Bartholomew or Philip comes I shall be surprised' is a stronger total assertion than 'If Philip comes I shall be surprised '. At the same time, there are cases in which this procedure will merely leave the force of the original implication unaltered. For example, the statement 'If either Bartholomew or Philip comes, Philip will come' is not really any stronger an assertion than 'If Bartholomew comes Philip will come ', since it will be true in any case that Philip will come if Philip comes. Now one form of statement which is weaker than Np (the antecedent in our CNpq) is Cpq; for both in two-valued and in three-valued logic 'Not-p' implies 'If p then q' whatever q may be, but is not always implied by it. Hence the replacement of Np in CNpq by this weaker proposition Cpq will yield either a stronger assertion than the original CNpq or one equivalent to it; and it turns out to yield an equivalent form in two-valued logic and a stronger one in three-valued. In two-valued logic, the replacement of CNpq by CCpqq has something of the artificiality of the replacement of Cpq by CApqq in our example above, and makes no difference. (It does in fact amount to the replacement of CNpq by CANpqq, since in this logic Cpq is equivalent to ANpq). But in three-valued logic, when p -1 and q = 1 CNpq and CCpqq will have different truth-values, the former being true (CN" == CT = 1) and the latter not (CCMi C1 i = 2) and this is precisely the point at which, in the three-valued system, the truth-tables for CNpq and Apq are different. CCpqq consequently serves ideally for the definition of Apq when this system is axiomatised.
The relative weakness of the relation represented in the three-valued system by 'C' may also be brought out by considering the force of the statement CNpp, 'If not-p then p '. In most senses of 'imply ', when a proposition is implied even by its own negation, we may infer that the proposition in question is true. (This is the 'Law of Clavius ', also referred to by certain Polish Jesuits as the consequentia mirabilis6). But the relative strength of the propositions 'If not-p then p ' and the plain 'p' depends considerably upon the kind of implication involved. From ' Not-p strictly implies p' we may infer 'p', but not vice versa (we cannot infer 'Not-p strictly implies p ' from ' p ' but only from ' p is necessary '). But the weaker statement 'Not-p materially implies p' not only (in two-valued logic) implies the simple ' p ' but is implied by it (for if ' p ' is true it is materially implied by any proposition, including 'Not-p '). And with the still weaker CNpp of three-valued logic the direction of implication is reversed, CNpp in this sense being implied by p but not implying it. In either of the last two senses CNpp is true so long as Np is no closer to truth than p is; but whereas in two-valued logic the only way for this to happen is by Np being false and p true, in three-valued logic it may also happen by Np and p both having the value ?.
When Np is no closer to truth than p is, whether because p is true and Np consequently false, or because p has the value ? and Np consequently the same, we might describe p as 'possible' (m6iglich). The assertion CNpp, abbreviated to 'Mp', is therefore sometimes read 'It is possible that p'. NMp will then be 'It is impossible that p '; and NMNp ('It is not possible that not-p') will be 'It is necessary that p'. We shall sometimes for convenience abbreviate 'NMp' to 'Ip' and 'NMNp' to 'Sp' (' S' being the symbol for 'It is necessary that' in some modal systems using the Polish notation7); and we shall also use ' Qp ' for 'It is contingent that p ', taking this to mean that both p and Is it really the case that 'It is impossible that p ' is automatically true if p happens to be false ? ' Q1 = 0 ' (i.e. ' It is contingent that p ' is automatically false if p happens to be true), ' QO = 0 ', ' S1 = 1 ' and 'MO = 0 ' are similarly startling. We shall find, however, that their oddity largely disappears if we relate the system to the problem which it was originally designed for handling-the problem of 'future contingents'. To this we may now turn.
The terms 'proposition' and 'true' are nowadays generally used in such a way that we cannot speak of the truth-value of a proposition as altering with the passage of time. This usage, however, has not always been the common one. Ancient and medieval usage was generally such that logicians could speak (as Aristotle did speak'l) of 'Socrates is sitting down' as a 'proposition' which is 'true' at those times at which he is sitting down and false at those times at which he is not. And what is more important, Aristotle speaks" of some propositions about the future as being neither true nor false when they are uttered, on the ground that there is as yet no definite fact with which they can accord or conflict. Professor Broadl2 has spoken in this way of all propositions whatever that refer (as we loosely say) to the future; but Aristotle speaks thus only of propositions about such future events as are not already predetermined. That there are such events he is convinced, for otherwise 'there would be no need to leliberante or take trouble. on the supnosition that if we should adopt a Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic is admirably adapted to the expression of this way of regarding statements about contingent future events. The value ' 1 ', of course, attaches to statements which are definitely true, either because they refer to timeless relations (e.g. '2 + 2 = 4') or because that of which they speak has already come to pass or is already coming to pass, or because its coming to pass is already determined; the value '0' to statements which are definitely false for analogous reasons; and the value ' ' to statements about the undetermined future. Given this interpretation, there is a clear sense in which what is definitely false is always 'impossible' (10 = 1) and what is definitely true always 'necessary' (S1 = 1). For we have definite truth and definite falsehood only when the possibility of turning out one way or the other which attaches to some future events is for one reason or another absent. An interesting feature of the modal functions, to which Jordan draws attention, is that they never take the third truth-value. For 'It is possible that p ' is definitely true not only when p is definitely true but also when it is not yet either true or false; 'It is impossible that p ' definitely false under both these conditions; and similarly with the others. This peculiarity accords well enough with our intuitive notion of a 'possibility' as that which is somehow real even when that of which it is a possibility is not yet so; and it has the effect of giving a two-valued character to the modal part of the three-valued system. Thus although ApNp, ' Either p or not-p ' is not a law of this system, it is a law that any proposition either is or is We can also say that any proposition either is or is not true (or false, or indeterminate). This is not, indeed, the sort of fact about the propositions of a system which can be expressed in the system itself; but my point is that even if the ' meta-system' in which we do express it is itself threevalued, the question as to the truth, falsehood or indeterminacy of a proposition of the original system is a question as to present and therefore determinate fact, so that the logic or part of logic with which we handle such a question is itself in effect two-valued.
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Aristotle's chapter on 'future contingents' was the subject of much discussion among the later medieval logicians, who were worried by the problem of reconciling Aristotle's views here (if this could be done) with the doctrine of God's foreknowledgel3. In connection with the Aristotelian statement quoted above, that 'When it is, whatever is is-necessarily, and when it is not, whatever is not necessarily is-not', numerous medieval commentators (and some modern ones14) have argued that we cannot say that 'whatever is is-necessarily', but only that 'necessarily, whatever is is'. This criticism seems to assume that the necessity of which Aristotle here speaks is logical necessity. A thing's being does not make the proposition that it is a logically necessary proposition, though the complete proposition 'Whatever is is' is logically necessary. Aristotle was not blind to the distinction here made, for he makes it himself in other contexts,l5 and if we are correct in our surmise that the necessity to which he refers in 'When it is, etc. ' is necessity of a different sort, the criticism is beside the point. It is in any case important to notice that logical necessity is not what the 'NMN' of Lukasiewicz's three-valued logic refers to. For ' NMNp' is in this system a truth-function, while 'It is logically necessary that p' is in no system a truth-function, but rather expresses a consequential higher-order characteristic of some truth-functions. For example, the assertion that 'If Socrates is dead he is dead' is logically necessary is not automatically made true by the fact that its argument, 'If Socrates is dead he is dead ', has the truth-value it has, namely truth; it is true, rather, because the function 'If p then p ', which 'If Socrates is dead he is dead' exemplifies, is true no matter what the truth-value of p may be. On the other hand ' NMN IfSocrates-is-dead-he-is-dead ' (where NMN is interpreted as in the system now being considered) is true simply because 'If Socrates is dead he is dead' is true; that is, it is true for precisely the same sort of reason as 'NMN Socrates-is-dead' is now true.'6 Logically necessary propositions do of course form a sub-class of 'necessary' propositions in the sense of the system. The distinction between Lukasiewicz's truth-functional necessity and logical necessity may also be brought out by considering the following case : In Lukasiewicz's system, whenever Np is true we have not only NMp but also, and consequently, CNpNMp. (' If not-p then not possibly p' is true under these conditions because its antecedent and consequent are true). And since CNpNMp is (in these circumstances) true, it is (in these circumstances) 'necessary'. But it is not for that reason a logical law. If it did turn out to be a logical law, CMpp would also be a logical law (for CMpp follows from CNpNMp by the substitution of Mp for q in the axiom CCNpNqCqp and detachment of the consequent). And if CMpp were a law, since in any case CpMp is a law, ' p ' and 'Mp ' would be mutually inferable, the distinction between truth and indeterminacy would disappear (for Mp never takes the third truth-value) and the three-valued logic would collapse into a two-valued one. But in fact, although CNpNMp is true when p is true as well as when p is false, it is not true when p is indeterminate; for we then have CN--NM -= CN-NN1 = C0O = 2. Hence it is not true regardless of the truth-value of its arguments, i.e. it is not a logical law; so the system stands firm17.
We may contrast this with another case in which 'It is impossible that p' is implied by what appears to be a weaker proposition, and in which the implication is a logical law. The apparently weaker proposition is 'It is possibly impossible that p '-we do have, for all values of p, CMNMpNMp, ' If it is possible that p is not possible, then p is not possible '. It is only possible for p to be impossible when it is true that p is impossible; for although ' p is impossible ' might also be possible if it were indeterminate, indeterminacy is in fact a truth-value which NMp, being a modal function, never has. This thesis CMNMpNMp, von Wright has pointed out18, is a distinguishing law of Lewis's 'strongest' modal system S5, though there are other modal systems in which it does not hold.
In sum, three-valued logic does seem to bring new precision to our handling of statements with tenses (as opposed to the fundamentally tenseless propositions of the common systems); and we may say that Lukasiewicz has, by means of it, done for Aristotle's chapter on 'future contingents' what he has done elsewhere for the Aristotelian theory of the syllogism. This does not mean, however, in this case any more than in the other, that in being given this new form the substance of the Aristotelian position survives without alteration. There is at least one feature of the Aristotelian account of future contingents which a three-valued logic seems incapable of preserving. For Aristotle held not only that (1) if p is a proposition about contingent future events (e.g. ' There will be a sea-battle to-morrow '), it is neither true nor false; but also that (2) the disjunctive proposition l7Lukasiewicz introduces this proposition CNpNMp, and points out the consequences of supposing it a logical law, when discussing the Aristotelian ' When it is not, whatever is not necessarily is-not'; and there has been considerable argument about it. But the above seem to be the plain facts of the matter. 'Either p or not p' (' Either there will or there will not be a sea-battle to-morrow '), being not a contingent but a necessary disjunction, is always true. But, as we have already noted, ApNp is not one of the laws of the Lukasiewicz- Tarski 
